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Abstract
In an increasingly data-driven age of medicine, do companies that offer genetic testing directly to patients
represent an important part of personalising care, or a dangerous threat to privacy? Should we celebrate this new
mechanism of patient involvement, or fear its implications?
The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge addressed these issues in the 10th annual Medical Ethics Varsity Debate,
through the motion: “This House Regrets the Rise of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing”. This article summarises
and extends key arguments made in the debate, exploring the impacts of such genetic testing on both the
individual patient and broader society, with special consideration as to whether companies can ever truly
guarantee anonymity of genetic data.
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Background
Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing refers to
any form of genetic testing sold directly to consumers
without the involvement of a medical professional.
Consumers are sent a buccal swab as part of a kit,
which they return through the post. This sample is
then analysed for several thousand different single nu-
cleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) at various genomic
loci, in order to provide information about the indi-
vidual’s genetic constitution [1].
The market for such tests is competitive, and cur-
rently occupied by a variety of different companies,
such as 23andMe, Atlas Biomed and EasyDNA [2–4]. It
is currently estimated as worth $140 million worldwide
and projected to be worth around $340 million by 2022
[5]. While tests were originally marketed mainly to pro-
vide information about an individual’s ancestry and
family history, over recent years they have become in-
creasingly medically-focussed. Many companies now
highlight the ability to identify an individual’s genetic
susceptibility to a range of diseases, one such example
being 23andMe’s screening for BRCA 1 and 2, noting their
predictive value in breast and ovarian cancer [6–8].
In determining the burden of proof for this debate,
we considered the impact of these tests on the individ-
ual consumer and on society as a whole, with regards
to both medical benefits and potential threats to priv-
acy. In order to claim whether we should regret the rise
of such testing or not, opposing sides were required to
demonstrate either overall net harm or benefit in rela-
tion to both the individual and society.
Thus, the debate and this re-analysis of the relevant is-
sues, centre on these three questions:
1. Is DTC testing beneficial or harmful to individual
users?
2. Is DTC testing beneficial or harmful to society as a
whole?
3. Do DTC tests represent a threat to privacy?
Question 1-is DTC testing beneficial or harmful to
individual users?
In asking whether DTC tests represent a net good or
harm to the individuals who choose to use them, it is
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reasonable to start by considering what the manufactur-
ing companies claim.
Atlas Biomed and EasyDNA, for example, suggest that
their clients will derive some degree of satisfaction
through learning about their own genomes, but also
market strongly on the potential for disease prevention
through diet and lifestyle changes [4, 9].
The first claim is reasonable. People who choose to
undergo genetic testing at their own volition and ex-
pense might well be expected to gain some degree of in-
tellectual satisfaction or entertainment value from doing
so, and in learning something about their own genetic
makeup. Indeed, available evidence supports this claim.
59% of a Canadian cohort considering DTC testing
claimed to be motivated by curiosity [10], while 80% of a
post-test cohort described themselves as having gained
satisfaction from the test [11].
This certainly provides a benefit in favour of DTC
tests: they provide direct satisfaction and entertainment
to consumers through assuaging curiosity and providing
a point of interest. This point was accepted without
challenge by both sides in the debate.
However, evidence also shows that 82% of people con-
sidering DTC genetic tests wanted to know their risk
status for heritable diseases [12]. Similarly 93% claim
they’d use the test to change their lifestyle if they found
themselves at a higher risk of disease and 80% wanted to
inform their children of their genetic risks and to allow
their doctor to monitor their health more closely [13].
Importantly, the Canadian cohort provides the only
head-to-head comparison of patients’ reasons for pur-
chasing DTC tests. While 59% of the group were moti-
vated by curiosity when considering genetic tests, 95%
were interested in their risk for developing medical con-
ditions. Furthermore all were more interested in pur-
chasing genetic tests relating to more serious genetic
conditions as opposed to less serious and were willing to
pay more for these [10].
Therefore we must also consider the claim that such
testing will encourage individuals to improve their diet
and lifestyles.
As an example, Atlas Biomed tests for predisposition
to 17 multi-factorial diseases, including type II diabetes
mellitus (T2DM), hypertension and obesity [14].
While the company doesn’t reveal exactly which exact
genes have made it onto their panel, it is clear from the
literature that they have carefully selected diseases with
complex and common heritability. For example 30–50% of
the variability in blood pressure is due to genetic her-
itability and up to 50% of individuals with hyperten-
sion have genetic factors that contribute to this [15]. Many
of these genes are involved in the renin-angiotensin-aldoster-
one system, and are found scattered across chromosomes 7,
8, 18 and 21 [16, 17].
Similarly while there are some monogenic causes of
obesity, generally involving the hormone leptin and its
receptor, these are rare: being present in fewer than 5%
of patients with severe obesity [18]. Far more common
are a range of SNPs with smaller effect sizes clustered in
this pathway, that contribute to the genetic component
of non-monogenic obesity [19, 20]. T2DM presents a
similar picture: with over 70 susceptibility genes contrib-
uting to its heritability.
Supporters of DTC testing argue that individuals thus
informed of a greater risk of developing these diseases
might increase their weekly exercise and improve their
diet in response: the personal information provided by
DTC testing might provide a direct spur to addressing
modifiable risk factors.
Of course the converse argument is also possible. It is
entirely conceivable that other patients, given a much
better genetic prognosis, might take it as justification for
adopting a rather more laissez faire attitude to diet and
exercise.
Upon turning to the evidence to ask which of these re-
sponses to testing is more likely we find a thoroughly
equivocal response. When a cohort of 2240 patients
were followed up a year after their genetic testing there
was no change in their fat intake or exercise from base-
line levels pre-testing [11], suggesting that neither the
proposition nor opposition could claim this point in the
debate.
A much more important argument however is the ques-
tion of whether DTC testing could reveal an individual’s
genetic susceptibility for potentially life-threatening condi-
tions such as cancer, through screening for BRCA 1 and 2,
and what the implications of such knowledge would be.
The debate came to hinge on this question.
Such screening carries two obvious benefits, which we
will illustrate with the example of BRCA screening.
Firstly, knowledge of an increased susceptibility to
breast and ovarian cancer will allow a patient to act
pre-emptively. For example, prophylactic mastectomy
and salpingo-oophorectomy significantly reduce the risk
of developing breast and ovarian cancer respectively [21,
22]. Thus DTC testing informs patients of relevant risks,
and allows them to act to reduce these.
Secondly, even if patients choose not to undergo such
risk-reducing surgery, they will be more aware of their
chances of developing such cancers. Thus they can in-
form themselves of the relevant signs and symptoms and
choose to undergo regular screening in order to detect
any such cancer as soon as possible. Given that the effi-
cacy of cancer treatment is enhanced by early detection
[23, 24] DTC testing might reasonably be expected to in-
crease life expectancy.
However, we would argue that this is a simplistic view of
testing, and needs more thorough consideration. Although
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the BRCA genes provide important information about an
individual’s risk of cancer, they need to be interpreted in the
context of an individual’s family history and other risk fac-
tors: including alcohol intake, age at menarche and age at
menopause [25]. Such interpretation is an important med-
ical role, normally fulfilled by a clinical geneticist, and the
fact that DTC testing provides genetic information without
concurrent medical interpretation and advice, provides sev-
eral definite harms.
The first such harm is that information, without con-
current interpretation and medical advice, is likely to
generate distress and anxiety in those tested. It is one
thing to be told that you have a 70% chance [6, 7] of de-
veloping cancer, by a doctor who has been trained to
break bad news well and who then provides immediate
advice on potential risk-reducing interventions or avail-
able screening programmes. It is another to receive the
same news in a paper report from an anonymous com-
pany, run by medically unqualified staff and which does
not provide either potential treatment or advice con-
cerning the results.
Thus while supporters of DTC testing suggest that it
allows patients to address their particular health risks
directly, this hinges on access to appropriate medical ad-
vice and treatment. Without this, we argue that such
screening can only be harmful: generating anxiety by
informing patients of risks of serious diseases about
which they can do very little.
A range of evidence supports this position. In 2014
Boeldt et al. showed that people who received DTC test
results showing a higher risk for diseases such as colon
cancer or Alzheimer’s disease had increased anxiety after
testing [26]. Similarly others who received DTC test re-
sults showing an increased risk of developing alcoholism
showed a decrease in mood and increase in anxiety
afterwards [27].
In the case of breast cancer, a recent case report proves en-
lightening. Dohany and colleagues describe a woman who
learned she had a BRCA mutation through a genetic test
and subsequently developed severe anxiety, distress and in-
somnia [28]. Importantly, she only recovered after several
sessions of genetic counselling, during which she planned a
risk reducing salpingo-oophorectomy along with breast sur-
veillance. She reports that her ability to address her increased
risk through surgery and intensive surveillance, along with
the genetic counselling, was key in her recovery.
This is supported by work from Francke and col-
leagues in 2013, who followed a group of 16 women
after they received similar BRCA diagnoses [29]. While 4
initially developed similar levels of anxiety, all recovered
well upon accessing genetic counselling and planning
surgery to reduce their risk of cancer.
Therefore, while we can argue that DTC screening will
initially provide a large degree of anxiety upon receipt of
results, it is also important to assess how individuals will
access further care, as this can be vital in preventing
post-test anxiety. We must also consider whether this is
harmful at an individual and societal level.
In states with privately funded healthcare, such as the
USA, a particular set of problems emerge when we con-
sider individuals with a level of income sufficient to pur-
chase DTC testing but insufficient to provide further
medical care. While tests now cost around $100–150 [3,
4], access to medical services can be far more expensive
than this, and risk-reducing surgery is even more costly,
with risk-reducing mastectomies costing between
$16,000 and $44,000 [30].
Therefore, in this case, DTC clearly fails to fulfil Wilson’s
criteria for an effective screening programme [31]: if the pa-
tient cannot access risk-reducing surgery for their greater
risk of breast cancer then it is undesirable to screen for
such a risk.
At the individual level this harm is reflected in the
continued anxiety the patient is likely to experience:
knowing they have a high risk of developing cancer
without any option to reduce that risk. This clearly
qualifies as a net harm to the individual as a result of
DTC testing.
Question 2-is DTC testing beneficial or harmful to
society as a whole?
To answer this second question we can apply the above
hypothetical BRCA patient to a state funded healthcare
system, such as the UK’s National Health Service (NHS).
Here the patient has immediate and free access to
medical services through their GP. Presenting this doc-
tor with evidence of a greatly increased risk of cancer
will be sufficient to gain referral to secondary care with-
out any additional cost.
The patient will therefore be able to access both the
necessary genetic interpretation and, if their risk is suffi-
ciently great, risk-reducing mastectomy or other relevant
treatments.
Whether this constitutes a net good or harm to society
however, hinges on a deeper ethical question.
The allocation of resources in the NHS is determined by
organisations such as The National Institute for Health
and Clinical Excellence (NICE). These exist to maximise
the improvement in quality and quantity of life that can
be generated with public funding: approving interventions
that generate the maximum gain in years of quality life
(QALYs) per unit funding [32]. Screening for BRCA is
already available in the NHS for patients with a pre-test
probability of having a BRCA 1 or 2 mutation of 10% or
more, as estimated from family history [33].
It was argued during the debate that when a patient ac-
cesses a GP service and is referred for further assessment
and treatment because of results obtained privately, they
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are consuming resources which otherwise would have
been spent on patients purely on the basis of clinical need
and maximising utility. It might then be argued that DTC
testing provides a route for patients to access NHS ser-
vices on the basis of their ability to pay an initial £150
cost. This therefore subverts the role of organisations such
as NICE, instead causing a redistribution of NHS re-
sources to those with a greater ability to pay.
The contrasting view is that by taking the financial
burden of screening upon themselves, patients actually
increase the number of QALYs purchased per unit ex-
penditure by the NHS, as the health service is presented
with BRCA positive patients, and can begin counselling
and treatment immediately. By contrast, the cost of
screening 10 patients for each one who is found to be
BRCA positive (given a pre-test probability of 10%) in-
creases the cost per QALY bought if the NHS is also re-
sponsible for the screening.
Is DTC testing beneficial or harmful to society as a
whole? The answer hinges on a second question - is an
increase in QALYs per unit of NHS expenditure a bene-
fit if it comes through redistribution of QALYs to the
disproportionately wealthy? Do we value overall QALYs
obtained, or equality of access to those QALYs?
The redistribution of NHS resources on the basis of
ability to pay for DTC testing is fundamentally opposed
to the founding principle of the service: that care should
be provided on the basis of clinical need alone rather
than the ability to pay. The subversion of this principle
by allowing access to services through privately obtained
results could therefore be seen as unethical: a mechan-
ism by which DTC tests and their sequelae are harmful
to society.
However, the principle of equality of access at the
core of the NHS is in turn based on ideas of promot-
ing equality across society as a whole. In broad terms
this is desirable because the psychological and health
harms of inequality can be so severe. Greater societal
inequality is associated with increased obesity [34],
shorter life expectancy, reduced health [35] and in-
creased mortality [36].
In order to analyse whether the form of inequality that
DTC testing generates will lead to these harms, we first
need to understand exactly how they derive from in-
equality. Why is it that an unequal society gives rise to
unhappy and unhealthy people?
Classically sociological arguments contend that eco-
nomic inequality leads to increased mistrust and status
competition. Such effects then induce negative effects
on health and well-being [37].
Inequality leads to a generalised distrust of others,
with perception that the economic system is unfair. Such
a breakdown in trust between individuals contributes to
shorter life expectancy because the breakdown of social
groups leads to less healthy lives [38]. In particular deg-
radation in trust and cooperation between individuals
strongly correlates with levels of depression and other
mental health conditions [39–42].
These psychological effects of inequality derive from
the processes outlined in social comparison theory. Indi-
viduals compare social standing on criteria such as fi-
nancial resources, where there are few objective
standards, in order to build a perception of their own
status [43]. Via the status-anxiety hypothesis, individuals
make upwards comparisons between themselves and
others: those who perceive themselves as inferior experi-
ence discomfort [44]. This is consistent with data that
individuals are unsatisfied when neighbours are wealth-
ier [45] or if average pay in their occupation is higher
[46]. Satisfaction with one’s position is heavily dependent
on relative comparisons [47]. Vitally it is thus relative
comparisons that lead to the negative psychological ef-
fects of inequality.
Therefore, when we consider the inequality generated
by users of DTC tests accessing NHS services we can
use the arguments outlined above to determine whether
it is likely that significant harms will accrue.
In summary, the harms of inequality are mainly de-
rived from a perception of inequality, resulting in break-
down of social trust and generation of mental health
problems. Therefore, to generate these harms the in-
equality must be readily visible: people must be widely
aware of DTC testing, and must perceive the advantage
that it gives to those able to afford it.
Yet, knowledge of these tests and what they do is not
universal and we argue that they are not flagrant enough
breaches of NHS principles to result in any significant
public outcry that would lead to greater awareness.
There are two broad reasons to support this position.
Firstly public awareness of these tests in the first place is
very low: only around 13–14% of people are aware of
their existence [13, 48]. Secondly, it is a large jump from
knowing of the existence of these tests to fully consider-
ing the implications of their use in terms of QALYs and
NHS funding. There is certainly no evidence of this ar-
gument being made at the national level. A Google
search of ‘DTC testing inequality’ yields no UK news ar-
ticles raising concerns about the inequality harms of
DTC testing.
Even in the literature surrounding DTC testing we be-
lieve we are the first to make this argument. PubMed
searches of ‘DTC testing inequality’ and ‘Direct to con-
sumer testing inequality’ returned 16 results in total,
none of which made any reference to this argument.
It is reasonable that this could change in the future if
large amounts of inequality were made public by con-
certed press involvement. This would, however, rely on
the difficult conversion of an unaware public.
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Under the status quo, access to NHS services on the
back of DTC testing is simply not a form of inequality of
which many people are aware and about which people
care significantly. Thus we should not expect it to gener-
ate significant levels of the negative effects of inequality
outlined above.
Therefore, while this testing does undermine the aim
of the NHS not to discriminate on the basis of the ability
to pay, it is not incompatible with the principles behind
that aim: and will not generate significant harms of
inequality.
Thus, by generating an increase in QALYs gained per
unit of NHS expenditure, without generating significant
associated harms DTC tests represent a net benefit to
society.
It is also important to note that every case of po-
tential breast cancer that is treated prophylactically
on the basis of a DTC test is one fewer that is de-
tected at a more advanced stage. Not only does this
result in greater life expectancy, it also saves re-
sources: as treatment at a later stage involves not
only surgery but also chemotherapy and/or radiother-
apy, with far more extensive medical follow up.
Therefore more resources are saved at this later stage
through earlier diagnosis and treatment.
Question 3-do DTC tests represent a threat to
privacy?
A final question that bridges impacts on both society
and the individual is whether DTC genetic testing repre-
sents a dangerous threat to privacy.
While DTC companies frequently promise that all
genetic data remains anonymous, recent research ques-
tions whether that is ever possible.
Based on the principle that human Y chromosomes al-
most always segregate with surname, as in almost all so-
cieties children take their father’s surname, several
databanks now exist that are able to pair Y chromosome
sequence data with likely surname. Using this principle,
along with other publically available data such as birth
records, Gymrek and colleagues were able to identify 50
supposedly anonymous individuals whose genomes were
available in public datasets in a proof of principle paper
in 2013 [49]. Projection of their methods predicts that
the same approach would be able to identify around 13%
of individuals from their genome data.
This raises important questions about the privacy of
genetic data held by DTC testing companies, and
whether it could be used to disadvantage those who have
undergone the testing. Clearly knowledge of an individ-
ual’s susceptibility to life-threatening diseases would be
of great interest to health, life and disability insurance
companies. In the USA the former are legally prevented
from discriminating on the basis of genetic data, by the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA). Life and disability insurance companies suffer
no such restrictions however [50].
Clearly this concern is speculative: we are not aware of
any reports of genetic data being used in such a way to
date.
In analysing whether this is a likely risk in the future
there are two main considerations.
Firstly, it is possible that the damaging publicity asso-
ciated with exploiting such legal loopholes might well
discourage DTC companies from doing so. If it became
known that they were profiting from the sale of genetic
data that was used to directly disadvantage their con-
sumers, then they could be at risk of seriously reduced
sales. Indeed the fact that they sell directly to these con-
sumers increases the importance of a positive public
image.
Secondly, even if such exploitation of genetic data
were to become commonplace, it would be possible for
states to amend existing legislation to prevent this.
Mechanisms could include a requirement to leave key
regions of the Y chromosome un-sequenced, or an ex-
pansion of the uses of data currently outlawed.
However, as noted above, this analysis is speculative:
given that this potential harm of DTC testing has not
yet materialised it is difficult to predict the likely out-
comes. Indeed the second point above raises the inter-
esting question of how quickly any state legislature
could respond to emergent technologies. An early ver-
sion of GINA was considered by congress in 1995 [51],
but it took 13 years before the legislation was actually
passed [52].
It might be possible that such legislation could be
amended in less time than it took to pass originally, but
there is the potential for serious harm to accrue through
the misuse of genetic data while states scramble to keep
up with private companies.
In summary, while Gymrek’s work shows it is often
impossible to anonymise an individual’s complete gen-
ome this advance has so far remained unexploited, and
future legislation could conceivably be prepared to pro-
tect privacy. However it is impossible to predict the like-
lihood of these prospective events with any certainty,
and thus to judge truly how serious the threat to individ-
ual privacy from DTC testing is.
Conclusions
DTC tests undoubtedly provide a source of interest and
enjoyment to those who choose to use them, and repre-
sent a speculative threat to privacy. However their most
important impacts revolve around screening for disease.
In this context we argue that whether they represent a
net good or harm hinges on the funding of healthcare in
the jurisdiction in which they are used. Where DTC
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tests can act as an adjunct to an existing state funded
healthcare system such as the NHS, they represent an
excellent mechanism for generating an increase in years
of quality life, through early diagnosis and treatment.
Importantly, harms relating to inequality at the societal
level are likely to be minimal. By contrast, where health-
care is privately funded DTC tests represent a much less
effective screening tool: likely generating significant anx-
iety and harm, without providing a route to effective and
accessible treatment.
Therefore the impacts of DTC tests cannot be ana-
lysed outside the societal context in which they arise,
and hence our titular question has two answers. If
healthcare is privately funded DTC tests are likely to
represent a net harm; in state-funded systems the con-
verse is true.
About the debate
The inaugural Varsity Medical Ethics Debate in 2008 con-
tinued the centuries-old rivalry between the Universities
of Oxford and Cambridge, and has run since then as an
annual event hosted alternately at the respective Unions.
This year The Cambridge Union played host to the 10th
annual debate, with an audience of medical students, doc-
tors and academics in attendance.
After consideration of the arguments raised by both
sides the judges awarded the victory to Oxford who,
interestingly, argued the opposite case to that made in
this article. Both sides however were able to enjoy a
broad and thorough consideration of the relevant issues,
and will follow the development of such testing over the
next few years with great interest.
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